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Abstract
The youth movement Nashi was established in Russia with the support of the Putin regime in 2005. 
The success of anti-regime demonstrators in Ukraine’s ‘Orange Revolution’ in 2004 had been noted in 
Moscow, and Nashi’s role was to serve as a pro-regime force to be mobilised against opposition. Its 
focus was the contentious politics of the street. Nashi represents an interesting theoretical case from 
the perspective of contentious politics and its relationship with civil society and formal party politics. 
Nashi’s role has developed to include facilitating young people’s engagement with party politics and 
business. Its early centralised control has been ameliorated somewhat by a reorganisation focused on 
local action. Nonetheless, Nashi exists with state support. Its continued role in contentious politics in 
support of the Putin regime, for example, countering opposition demonstrations in Moscow in 
December 2011, makes problematic its identification as a component of democratic civil society.
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Introduction
This article explores the dialectic between ‘street politics’ and ‘party politics’. In 
particular, it focuses on the role played by the pro-Kremlin youth movement Molodezhnoe 
demokraticheskoe anti-fashistskoe dvizhenie Nashi (‘Democratic anti-fascist youth movement 
Ours’ – hereafter referred to as Nashi). Although Nashi is not formally linked to any political 
party, its creation was supported by key Kremlin aide Vladislav Surkov, the movement 
explicitly adopts a pro-Putin stance, and some of its members have gone on to become 
parliamentary deputies for the ‘party of power’, United Russia. State support for Nashi comes 
in various forms. Government officials, including Presidents Putin and Medvedev, visit the 
youth movement’s annual summer camp, and Vladislav Surkov – number two in the 
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presidential administration until December 2011 when he became First Deputy Prime 
Minister – ‘holds regular meetings with activists from the Nashi youth movement’ (Beluza 
2011). In financial terms, although there is no ‘expenditure on Nashi’ item in the state budget, 
the youth movement is supported by donations and grants and Nashi’s closeness to the state 
has benefits in this regard.  Former Nashi leader, Vasilii Yakemenko, noted in 2005 that 
support from the Kremlin helps the movement to elicit support from businessmen for Nashi’s 
‘national project’ (Buribaev 2005). In 2012, having reached the position of head of 
RosMolodezh (the Federal Agency for Youth Affairs), Yakemenko did not deny reports that 
government grants to Nashi amounted to around 200 million roubles ($ 6 million) in 2010 
(Azar 2012).
Nashi demands attention when considering party politics in Russia for three particular 
reasons. First, the closed party system that has developed in Russia since Putin became 
president in 2000 has forced marginalised opposition parties out onto the streets to engage in 
contentious activity. Nashi was created as the Kremlin’s instrument to counter such 
engagement. This growth in contentious politics has extended the scope for considering the 
primary activities of political parties to include areas other than the formal political arena. 
Second, the Putin years have seen an increased focus in Russia on youth participation by 
political parties, partly in recognition of the role played by youth movements in the ‘coloured 
revolutions’ in the Ukraine and Georgia.  As such, analysis of Nashi’s place in Russian 
politics and its influence within the formal political arena extends the literature on Russian 
party politics to incorporate this new focus on youth participation. Third, the growing 
significance of ‘street politics’ as an alternative space for political struggle demands a 
reconsideration of the relationship between political parties, contentious politics, and 
(un)civil society in contemporary Russia. This alternative political space is contested not only 
on the street, but also in theoretical debate over the nature of civil society in Russia.
2
Half a dozen years ago Edwin Bacon posed the question whether civil society under 
Putin was:
‘settling into a more Russian form, where the role of the state removes a degree of 
independence, but nonetheless distinct groups and movements remain, with a voice, a legal 
identity, and – not universal but nonetheless real in a number of cases – political influence?’ 
(Bacon 2006, pp. 111-112; Evans, Henry, & Sundstrom 2006, p. 319). 
In answer to this question, the case of Nashi exemplifies the limitations on the 
stretching of the concept ‘civil society’, which would already in most definitions exclude 
political parties. From one perspective, Nashi is, to use the definition of civil society 
developed by Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, a group operating in the political arena which has 
a relationship with the state but does not aim to occupy it (Linz & Stepan 1996). For those 
who would echo Antonio Gramsci’s insistence on an antithetical relationship between the 
state and civil society, such a proposition already stretches the concept of civil society too far. 
Not only does Nashi receive support from the state, but the Putin regime instigated its very 
formation. Debates concerning the nature of civil society, however, are not limited to 
technical questions over sources of funding and other forms of support. Normative concerns 
for democratic development also colour the study of civil society, for example, in Robert 
Putnam’s work on the relationship between social capital and democratisation (Evans et al. 
2006, p. 4; Putnam, Leonardi, & Nanetti 1993). Some would argue that from this perspective 
Nashi can be seen as doubly damned. First, it engages in contentious politics, direct and 
occasionally physical actions against adversaries, and as such represents ‘uncivil’ rather than 
civil society. Second, Nashi fights on the side of the state. Cas Mudde argues, however, that 
the theoretically problematic  distinction between civil and uncivil society very often comes 
down to what side a group is on in relation to the state or to international opinion. With 
regard to most political positions, this represents a subjective judgement which is difficult to 
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justify empirically (Kopecký & Mudde 2003, pp. 160-161). In the case of Nashi, for example, 
its ‘civil’ anti-racist stance clashes with its more ‘uncivil’ role in closing down the political 
space available to opponents of Russia’s ruling regime.
This article’s analysis of Nashi adopts Petr Kopecký’s stance that arguments over who 
is ‘in’ and who is ‘out’ in terms of civil society should give way to a focus on associational 
life in a country as a whole (Kopecký & Mudde 2003, p. 15). From this perspective we argue 
that although Nashi has some of the traits of a civil society organisation that might be seen to 
promote gradual democratisation, such as the mobilisation of young people and their 
engagement in political activity, at present the closeness of its links to a semi-democratic 
regime and willingness to serve as the regime’s instrument in street politics undermine any 
such pro-democratic traits. The article begins by exploring the development of the pro-
Kremlin youth movement Nashi from the perspective of the political behaviour and 
associated norms cultivated by the youth movement. It examines the resurgence of street 
politics in Russia following the 2004 ‘Orange Revolution’ in Ukraine and tracks Nashi’s 
political activity from 2005 to 2011 in order to build up a profile of the forms of political 
participation promoted by the youth movement. We then consider Nashi’s turn towards more 
formal  politics following the election season of 2007-08, noting the movement’s role as a 
source of recruits into formal party politics. Finally, we return, in the light of recent events 
including the anti-regime demonstrations of December 2011, to our consideration of Nashi’s 
place in relation to civil society and the state, arguing that the movement’s role supporting the 
regime ‘on the streets’ in contentious politics remains a defining characteristic as long as 
Russia’s democratic deficit persists. 
Nashi and Contentious Politics
4
Several analyses of politics in Russia since Nashi’s formation in 2005 have drawn 
attention to the rising significance of contentious politics (Byzov 2007; Schwirtz 2007; 
Yashin 2007).  For example, Ilya Yashin (a leader of the opposition group Solidarnost 
‘Solidarity’) asserts that young political leaders today need to be ‘street orators’, able to lead 
people onto the street and to stand in front of police cordons (Yashin 2007).  The origins of 
the rise in street politics at this time appear to be straightforward. First, their engineered 
exclusion from the formal political arena has forced some opposition groups onto the streets 
in an attempt to support their cause, and the pro-Kremlin youth organisations have followed 
as a counter-measure sponsored by the incumbent regime. Alexei Mitrofanov, State Duma 
deputy for the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, offered a provocative commentary on 
street politics in contemporary Russia noting, in relation to the leading role of Mikhail 
Kasyanov (Russia’s Prime Minister, 2000-2004) in anti-systemic opposition protests, that, ‘in 
normal countries a person runs around on the street for 10 to 15 years and then becomes 
prime minister, but [in Russia] we have someone who used to be prime minister and now runs 
around on the streets’ (Byzov 2007). 
Second, the example of the potential power of people taking to the streets en masse 
during Ukraine’s ‘Orange Revolution’ set a precedent for mobilisation that proved instructive 
to the opposition and the Kremlin alike. In a demonstration of its power and resources Nashi 
launched its mass actions with a 50,000-strong gathering in Moscow on 15 May 2005, called 
Nasha Pobeda (‘Our Victory’) and designed to symbolise the young generation taking on 
from Russia’s war veterans the task of maintaining the country’s independence. Since then 
the youth movement has regularly staged such mass actions.  On 4 November  2009 Nashi 
organised a ‘Russian March’ to celebrate National Unity Day in Moscow, which attracted 
around 30,000 participants (Nashi 2009a) and the movement has also continued its annual 
‘Our Victory’ rallies, gathering more than 65,000 young Russians to commemorate the 65th 
5
anniversary of Victory Day in May 2010 (Nashi 2010).  In December 2011, when the western 
media widely reported anti-regime demonstrations in Moscow following flawed 
parliamentary elections, Russian television gave as much, if not more, weight to pro-regime 
rallies organised by Nashi (Sulimina 2011).
Contentious political phenomena include mass rallies and public demonstrations 
complete with slogans, posters, symbols and other theatrical elements. Recent examples in 
Russia would include pensioners’ protests against the monetisation of welfare benefits in 
January 2005. However, with regard to youth politics in contemporary Russia, and more 
specifically the role of pro-Kremlin groups such as Nashi on the street, it is the physicality of 
the battle between the opposition and Kremlin loyalists that stands out. Contentious politics 
in this setting alludes to the rough, no-holds-barred politics of the street compared to the 
columned halls and privileges of party politics. Head of the analytical department of All-
Russia Central Institute of Public Opinion (VTsIOM), Leonti Byzov, identified the purpose of 
street politics for pro-Kremlin groups to be combative and destructive:
If we analyse which political forces benefit from holding marches then it becomes 
evident that for [regime party] United Russia, for example, such marches are not 
necessary. However, [United Russia] has combat youth brigades such as Nashi, which 
are able to specialise in precisely that which United Russia is unable to. Mostly, though, 
their slogans are negative – always trying to deal someone a blow. (Byzov 2007)
Thus, the essence of Nashi’s role in street politics in Russia has been its more 
contentious activities when the movement has pursued a strategy of direct conflict with and 
intimidation of the opposition. 
Street Politics
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Under the heading of ‘developing a functioning civil society’ in Nashi’s manifesto, the 
following statement reveals Nashi’s explicit strategy of intimidation: 
We must set an example of social solidarity. Every oligarch or civil servant, street punk 
or member of a totalitarian organisation that raises its hand to one of our members 
should know that tomorrow he will have to deal with all of us. (Nashi 2005)
Infamously, after speaking at a conference of the opposition coalition Drugaya Rossiya 
(‘Other Russia’) in July 2006, British ambassador Anthony Brenton was repeatedly followed 
and harassed by Nashi activists in a prolonged campaign of intimidation over a period of a 
year and a half. In Nashi’s view ‘Other Russia’ was made up of ‘fascists, totalitarians and 
thieves’ and so should not be considered a part of civil society. Nashi demanded an apology 
from Brenton for apparently ‘insulting Russia’ by meeting with these opposition groups 
(Nashi 2007).  In a similar incident, in May 2007, Nashi activists staged protests outside the 
Estonian embassy in Moscow and harassed Estonian ambassador Marina Kaljurand. 
Protestors tore down the Estonian flag from the embassy building, forced entry in to a hall 
where the Estonian ambassador was speaking, and bombarded her car.
In addition to the campaigns against specific individuals carried out by the youth 
movement in reaction to particular incidents, Nashi also formed two groups – Dobrovol’naya 
Molodezhnaya Druzhina (‘Voluntary Youth Militia’ – hereafter DMD) and Molodezhnoe 
Patrioticheskoe Dvizhenie - Stal’ (‘Youth Patriotic Movement - Steel’) – dedicated to 
combatting the opposition on the streets. DMD is a splinter organisation of Nashi, established 
by Nashi under Vasily Yakemenko’s leadership in 2005, though formally a separate entity. 
Ostensibly created to work with law enforcement agencies in order to reduce crime, DMD 
activities have included patrolling the streets with police officers and engaging with 
disaffected gangs of youths to help them to turn away from drugs and crime. Unofficially, 
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DMD acts as Nashi’s muscle providing security and maintaining order at Nashi’s mass 
actions and major events. At Nashi’s summer camp ‘Seliger 2008’, DMD, tasked with the 
responsibility of ensuring that everyone was following the rules, patrolled the camp with 
uniforms bearing the slogan ‘I see that you are not working!’. DMD has been at the centre of 
numerous allegations of provocation and violence carried out by Nashi against the 
opposition. Nashi patrols were apparently mobilised by the authorities to counter opposition 
activity on the streets in the run up to the 2007-08 electoral season. More significantly, 
according to Moscow city law Nashi’s patrols were legally empowered to use force as a last 
resort should a lawbreaker be ‘actively disobedient’ (Nowak 2007).
Stal’, which is Russian for steel, is a fiercely patriotic group that views patriotism as a 
‘matter of national security’ and demands that such patriotism should be active not passive 
(Stal 2008). According to the movement itself, Stal’ is dedicated to using all methods and 
technologies available to ‘control street politics’ and thus secure Russia’s future as a global 
power and world leader (Stal 2008). Commissar of the Estonian division of Stal’, Mark Siryk, 
was arrested by police in Tallinn in April 2007 on charges of inciting disorder. The charges 
related to the riots that took place in Tallinn known as the ‘Bronze nights’, 26 to 28 April 
2007, when ethnic Russians protested against the decision to relocate a Soviet war memorial 
and burial site in the city.  However, Siryk was subsequently acquitted in court in January 
2009 on the grounds that there was insufficient evidence that the defendant had been involved 
in organising the riots. 
Cyber attacks
In addition to physical street politics, Nashi members have been linked to cyber attacks 
on those deemed unsympathetic to the youth movement’s cause. Following an article 
8
published by Kommersant in January 2008, the leading daily newspaper suffered from a 
cyber attack which crashed its website for five hours. The article in question had suggested 
that Nashi was becoming an embarrassment for the Kremlin and had outlived its purpose 
(Savina, Taratura, and Shevchuk 2008).  The attack on Kommersant’s website in March 2008 
was combined with the distribution of rolls of toilet paper printed with the Kommersant logo, 
quotes from the newspaper article in question and the phone number of one the article’s 
authors, leading Kommersant to accuse Nashi of responsibility for hacking into its website. 
Although Nashi denied any involvement in these incidents, according to a leaked internal 
email allegedly written by Nashi’s press secretary Kristina Potupchik, Nashi apparently called 
on its activists to ‘block [Kommersant’s] work’ and to ‘psychologically and physically pester 
them’ (Guillory 2008; Walker 2008).
In May 2007, the work of the Estonian government was impeded by a sustained attack 
on the country’s internet network. The websites of government ministries, parliament, 
prominent media distributors and banks were all disrupted by the cyber attack, which 
followed the repositioning of the Soviet Bronze Soldier war memorial from central Tallin to a 
local cemetery.  Estonian officials blamed the Russian government itself, which had been 
vociferous in condemning what they considered to be the desecration of the Soviet war 
memorial and burial site, but such accusations were repeatedly denied by the Kremlin. A 
NATO spokesman confirmed that the organisation pledged its political support for Estonia 
and considered the matter to be ‘an operational security issue’ (NATO 2009). NATO sent at 
least one expert to help the efforts of the Estonian government to repel the attacks and in May 
2008 set up the Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence in Tallinn. According to 
later reports, Nashi commissar and Duma deputy aide, Konstantin Goloskokov, claimed to 
have organised the Distributed Denial of Service attack as an ‘act of civil disobedience’ 
together with a network of loyal sympathisers and without the knowledge or support of Nashi 
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and the authorities (Reuters 2009). The Kremlin and Nashi deny any involvement in the 
cyber attack on Estonia. 
Contentious politics in this electronic form has emerged on the scene only relatively 
recently, and to be effective requires online co-ordination amongst a relatively large number 
of activists. Goloskov’s use of the term ‘civil disobedience’ to describe this action seems 
intended to echo the vocabulary of anti-state activists the world over, and in doing so to 
position the action conceptually alongside the contentious political acts of (un)civil society 
groups acting together against the policy of a state. Similarly, the creative ‘toilet roll protests’ 
against Kommersant would not be out of place in the contentious street politics of many 
youth-oriented political movements.
Nashi and nationalism
Nashi officially calls itself a ‘democratic, anti-fascist youth movement’, nonetheless its 
critics have compared it to radical far-right groups and at times referred to it as a fascist group 
itself. While Nashi is known for its aggressive campaigns against ‘non-patriotic elements’, it 
is not a racist organisation. Under the heading of securing Russia’s sovereignty in the 
movement’s manifesto, Nashi declares:
Cultural diversity is Russia’s greatest asset in the modern world. Religious and ethnic 
cooperation empowers our country to develop further ... Our generation’s task is to 
prevent the spread of fascist ideas, aggressive nationalism, religious intolerance and 
separatism that threatens the unity and territorial integrity of Russia. (Nashi 2005)
On 4 November 2009, Nashi staged mass anti-fascist rallies in Moscow in honour of 
National Unity Day. In a significant show of strength around 30,000 young Russians came 
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together in Moscow for Nashi’s ‘Russian March’ in defiance of right-wing and extreme 
nationalist organisations marching under the same banner elsewhere in Moscow. According 
to Nashi, the march underscored the youth movement’s commitment to defending human 
rights in Russia by undermining extreme right-wing groups that it alleges have been 
overlooked by human rights watchdogs. Nashi is keen to dispel any suggestion that it is a far 
right movement and, as noted below, has taken legal actions against those who make such 
allegations. 
The confusion over Nashi’s credentials in terms of tolerance becomes apparent not so 
much in the area of racial politics, where its position is theoretically and actually inclusive, 
but in relation to alternative political ideas. Nashi’s declared strategy of tackling fascism by 
increasing the dominance of its ideas among the younger generation further exemplifies: 
Only by spreading our ideological influence over the younger generation can we prevent 
young people from being drawn into extremist organisations of a fascist and liberal 
tendency [....] We must fight fascism in all its manifestations and support ethnic, 
religious and cultural unity for the good of our common home – Russia. The war on 
fascism is part of the fight for Russia’s integrity and sovereignty. (Nashi 2005)
Conflating extremism with fascism and liberalism, and indeed any political opposition 
to the regime, Nashi’s anti-fascist drive becomes primarily a campaign to shut out any 
alternatives. ‘A closer look at the rhetoric of the leaders of Nashi shows that anti-orange and 
anti-fascist definitions are often used in their arguments as synonymous’ (Topalova 2006, p. 
33).  This is no mistake, and indeed the twin threats to Russia identified by the Putin regime 
from its outset have been, externally, interference from the West, and internally, the rise of the 
far right. At the same time as seeking to promote inter-ethnic tolerance and cooperation 
within Russia, Nashi’s brand of anti-fascism denounces foreign influence. 
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Nashi’s apparent efforts to quell radicalism and extremism sit uneasily alongside 
attempts to deliberately play on nationalistic sentiment in order to attract and inspire young 
Russians to its cause. In this way, Nashi taps into and cultivates nationalism, despite the 
danger which it acknowledges chauvinism among youth to present to Russia. Nashi is not, 
however, by any means on its own in treading such a path. Perhaps the leading critic of the 
Putin regime during the protests of December 2011 and beyond in Moscow, blogger Alexei 
Navalny, has been criticised for several times joining nationalist demonstrations, including 
the ‘Stop Feeding the Caucasus’ rally in October 2011 (Balmforth 2011). Academics such as 
Pilkington, Topalova, Smith, Zorkaia & Diuk and others note the development of a radical 
youth sub-culture in Russia, with an increasing propensity for aggressive nationalism and 
susceptibility to militaristic rhetoric (see Topalova, Pikington with Starkova 2002, p. 113; 
Zorkaia and Diuk 2004, p. 4-27).  According to the State youth policy, 51% of 18-35 year 
olds said that they would support evicting certain ethnic groups from their region (Ministry of 
Education and Science of the Russian Federation 2006, p. 2). Moreover, according to crime 
statistics for Russia, radical nationalism is exhibiting the potential to develop outside of the 
Kremlin’s control. Perhaps because of this real threat, Nashi consciously courts nationalistic 
sentiment. The youth movement’s combined effort with the United Russia youth wing, Young 
Guard, to counter the series of opposition ‘Dissenters’ Marches’ in 2007 was entitled ‘Russia 
for the Russians’, which although representing the movements’ desire to keep out foreign 
influences on Russian politics and to associate the opposition marches with Western 
sponsorship, is also a slogan employed by far right groups.
A Turn Towards Formal Politics
With the completion of the elections to the State Duma in December 2007, 
accompanied by Vasily Yakemenko’s resignation as Nashi leader in order to take up his new 
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post as head of the newly created State Committee on Youth Affairs, there seemed to be an 
opportunity for Nashi to retire from contentious politics and for its more prominent members 
to graduate to the formal political arena. Indicative of the manner in which Nashi was 
rewarded by the Kremlin with positions of power at a federal level, Robert Shlegel (Nashi 
commissar) and Sergei Belokonev (Nashi ideologue and former head of Nashi vybori – ‘Our 
Elections’ – the Federal Youth Association tasked with combating accusations of electoral 
fraud) were elected as State Duma deputies in December 2007.  Belokonev went on to 
become vice-chair of the Duma’s Committee on Youth Affairs. Furthermore, in addition to 
Yakemenko, who was appointed head of the agency, Nashi spokesperson and commissar 
Maria Drokova was awarded a position at the Federal Agency for Youth Affairs.  Although 
neither Nashi nor the Young Guard ultimately proved able to instigate any significant increase 
in the proportion of young people in the State Duma or regional assemblies), they did 
demonstrate the relative influence of Nashi and the Young Guard on the formation of United 
Russia’s party lists. Of the nineteen new young United Russia deputies elected to the State 
Duma in December 2007, six were members of pro-regime youth organisations and the others 
were mostly celebrities. 
It is evident then that Nashi can serve as an ‘escalator’ for young activists to enter 
formal party politics in Russia, and in this sense can be seen as a positive component of civil 
society, promoting engagement with political activity and developing social capital. However, 
Nashi’s closeness to the state, and its move towards competing for political power via 
engagement with the ‘party of power’ of an at best dubiously democratic regime, undermine 
the notion of Nashi being a democratising civil society organisation. Speaking to a group of 
Nashi activists at the movement’s summer camp in July 2008, newly elected Duma deputy 
and Nashi ideologue Sergei Belokonev urged his audience to be on the alert for any elections 
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in their regions so that the movement and RosMolodezh (the Federal Agency for Youth 
Affairs) could assist them in their endeavours to be elected.1 
Around the same time, at the end of January 2008, new leader Nikita Borovikov 
announced Nashi’s reorganisation.  This involved replacing all but five of the movement’s 50 
regional branches with nationwide projects developed around key priorities, such as the 
economy, education, and modernisation. The reorganisation, just before the presidential 
election, was largely dismissed as an attempt to position the movement in line with regime 
priorities beyond the 2007–2008 electoral season.  Yet, whilst it is true that the changes that 
took place in Nashi during 2008 were reflective of the changing political environment and the 
shifting priorities of the Kremlin, they hold further significance pertaining to this analysis of 
Nashi’s methods and political role. Borovikov’s announcement marked the beginning of a 
period in which Nashi would seek to diversify its activities and seemed set to leave behind 
the contentious politics of old. 
First, Nashi’s restructuring was a deliberate decision on its part to prevent the 
movement from being over-organised by the state. The new structure signified the youth 
movement’s decentralisation. Borovikov’s interview with the leading daily Kommersant 
explained how, as a result of this ‘radical reorganization’, Nashi would ‘no longer be a 
centralized federal organization and [would] be split into independent public groups’ 
(Kommersant, 2008). This represents a move away from the state, in organisational terms, 
and nearer to the classical concept of civil society. Prior to the movement’s restructuring in 
2008, Nashi was a highly centralised force geared to the rapid mobilisation of masses of 
young people. The youth movement’s activities were coordinated from Moscow and its 
leaders recruited bands of sympathetic young people from university campuses, sports clubs 
and other youth venues to be bussed to the capital to participate in Nashi’s mass actions. 
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Nashi’s reconfiguration drastically scaled back the role of the central leadership in order to 
facilitate local initiative and stimulate local level activity. 
Second, Nashi’s new emphasis on modernisation, enterprise, and innovation indicated a 
less contentious approach. It now sought to provide support for the government’s plans for 
modernisation in a constructive manner through promoting the development of innovative 
new business ideas. Nashi commissar Maria Drokova sums up this shift in her assessment of 
the youth movement’s changing purpose: ‘At the beginning Nashi’s sole task was to prevent 
an ‘Orange Revolution’ ... Now in Russia it is imperative to create something new.”2 While 
Nashi’s summer camp at Lake Seliger in 2007 was infamous for its hard-line stance regarding 
the opposition, one year later the primary focus of Seliger 2008 was on finding sponsors to 
support the development of youth enterprise initiatives. For example, the project 
Molodezhnaya Shkola Predprinimatel’stva (‘Youth School of Enterprise’) secured funding to 
enable it to begin training 100,000 young people in business planning  and to assist business 
start-ups (Nashi 2008). The adoption of a more consensual approach is associated with the 
transition from contentious politics to the more classical notion of civil society operating in 
the formal political arena. 
Nashi, civil society and the state 
Although Nashi has some of the traits of a civil society organisation that might be seen 
to promote gradual democratisation, such as the mobilisation of young people and their 
engagement in political activity, at present the closeness of its links to a semi-democratic 
regime and continued willingness to serve as the regime’s instrument in street politics 
undermine such democratic traits. In recent times there have been several incidents which 
indicate that, despite Nashi’s apparent reorientation towards more constructive activities and 
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desire to present itself as a reliable political force suitable for entry into the formal political 
arena, on occasion Nashi has sought to revert to the contentious politics practised by the 
movement in the run up to the 2007-08 electoral cycle. The protests surrounding the Duma 
and presidential elections of 2011-12 demonstrated both a continuing need for the Putin 
regime to pay attention to the challenge of contentious politics, and the changing role of 
Nashi in terms of meeting that challenge. At the same time, however, there is some evidence 
of a decline in the authorities’ ability to control and willingness to support Nashi in a number 
of cases.
In early October 2009 Nashi launched one of its infamous campaigns against 
individuals whom it deems to be unpatriotic. The target of the campaign was journalist and 
human rights activist Aleksandr Podrabinek – author of a controversial article published 
online in Ezhednevnyi Zhurnal (‘Daily Journal’), which criticised what it saw as the 
authorities’ glorification of the Soviet period. Nashi viewed Podrabinek’s article as offensive 
to war veterans, and the youth movement’s ensuing campaign against him was condemned by 
human rights watchdogs for amounting to harassment and physical intimidation. The 
Kremlin’s own Human Rights Council issued a statement criticising Nashi’s campaign 
against Podrabinek and accusing the movement of violating four articles of the Russian 
constitution. Despite calls for Ella Pamfilova to be dismissed from her post as chair of the 
Council on Human Rights, President Medvedev refused to sack Pamfilova on the basis of the 
council’s investigation into the legality of Nashi’s activities. Nonetheless, Pamfilova did 
herself resign the following year, after continued pressure from Nashi.  Then in March 2009 a 
solitary protest outside the Estonian embassy in Moscow by Mark Siryk, the Estonian 
commissar for Nashi’s ‘Stal’ programme, was stopped by police and Siryk was arrested.  In a 
break from previous practice the Kremlin, under President Medvedev, did not openly support 
Nashi’s actions and apparently sought to quell the youth movement’s excesses. Such a partial 
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distancing of the regime from Nashi was evident again in April 2011, when Minister of 
Finance Alexei Kudrin refused to fund a two million rouble ‘Youth of Russia’ programme, 
proposed by former Nashi leader Vasily Yakemenko in order to promote the core Kremlin 
priorities of patriotism and modernisation. Nonetheless, as Kudrin pointed out, the decision 
not to fund this programme stemmed partly from the fact that so much state money is already 
spent on  youth programmes (Sulimina 2011).
 Perhaps in response to changes in the political environment in Russia after the 
presidential election of 2008, Nashi also adopted a new strategy of seeking to legitimise the 
movement’s activities through formal legal procedures.  Although Nashi previously sued the 
newspaper Kommersant in 2006 for publishing inaccurate information, the use of litigation 
against unsympathetic media outlets became more significant in 2009. In November 2009 
Nashi won its case against Gazeta.ru for allegations published on its website that Nashi 
activists were involved in a physical assault on the prominent liberal opposition leader Boris 
Nemtsov. A qualitative shift in the use of litigation then came in the aftermath of the 
Podrabinek affair, when for the first time Nashi filed lawsuits against Western as well as 
Russian media for their coverage of the youth movement’s campaign against the journalist. 
Having brought cases against Russian media (broadcaster Ren-TV, newspaper Novaya 
Gazeta, and the website Polit.ru), Nashi filed a lawsuit against four European newspapers 
seeking damages from Le Monde, Le Journal du Dimanche, Frankfurter Rundshau, and The 
Independent for ‘insults to the dignity and honour’ of the organisation (Oliphant 2009).
In the election season of 2011-12 Nashi’s focus returned increasingly to contentious 
politics, rather than the formal politics of the campaign. Early in 2011 allegations flew back 
and forth concerning possible collaboration between the security forces and Nashi with 
regard to discovering the sources of financial support for key opposition blogger, Alexei 
Navalny. In later summer 2011, it was reported that a ‘background information’ document 
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published on a web-based discussion list set out the need for Nashi supporters to counter the 
attempts of oppositionists allegedly set on overthrowing the regime and allowing Western 
influence to dictate who rules Russia. The focus was on opponents such as Navalny and Boris 
Nemtsov, members of the non-systemic opposition – those whose political parties or 
movements had not been granted access to the formal politics of elections (Guillory 2011). 
This arena represents standard Nashi territory, as such figures instead engaged in the 
contentious politics fought out online and on the street. As noted earlier, in December 2011 
Nashi provided substantial numbers of demonstrators for the pro-regime marches which took 
place to counter the massive anti-regime demonstrations following the elections. 
Conclusions
It would be hard to call these pro-regime demonstrations of December 2011, and 
Nashi’s role in them, an unqualified success. Formed in 2005 in order to prevent the seeds of 
an ‘Orange Revolution’ from developing in Russia, Nashi’s founding purpose was to ensure 
that the streets would not be ceded to the opposition. In December 2011, and into 2012, 
however, massive anti-regime demonstrations took place, permitted by the authorities, in 
Moscow and other major cities. Nonetheless, Nashi did retain a role in such contentious 
politics. First, it was central to the mobilisation of supporters to similarly massive pro-regime 
demonstrations. Second, it had noted months earlier the dangers to the regime of anti-
systemic opposition, and had strengthened its capacity to engage in contentious politics on 
behalf of the regime. In  its early years Nashi contributed to the development of street politics 
in contemporary Russia. In a bid to counter opposition voices, Nashi’s tactics revolved 
around intimidation of particular individuals or organisations, as well as on broader action 
against all political opposition. Despite taking the opportunity to gain influence in the formal 
political arena as a reward for their loyalty to the incumbent regime in 2007-08, Nashi has not 
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eschewed contentious politics. Yet, this should not be perceived as indicative of the 
movement’s rejection of the formal political arena or of its failure in terms of party politics, 
but rather as further evidence that Nashi’s strength and relative influence originates from its 
power on the streets. Nashi’s function has been and continues to be to engage in activities that 
are not open to United Russia due to the constraints of operating within the formal political 
arena. 
Nashi does have some of the traits of a civil society organisation that might be seen to 
promote gradual democratisation. It provides, through its summer camps and other initiatives, 
education and opportunities for young people wishing to enhance their involvement with 
political and economic life. It serves too as a pool of recruits into formal politics, notably into 
United Russia, at all levels. However, considering associational life in Russia as a whole 
(Kopecký & Mudde 2003, p. 15), Nashi has been able to flourish almost solely because of the 
support it has received, from its founding initiative onwards, from the regime and the state 
authorities. Whether it be financial support, without which Nashi would not be able to fund 
participants across its range of contentious and more formal activities; whether it be support 
from the forces of law and order in its conduct of contentious politics, which facilitate such 
actions; or whether it be support from members of the regime at the highest level, which 
contributes to the setting of Nashi’s agenda; at present the closeness of Nashi’s relationship 
with a semi-democratic regime must colour our view of the movement in terms of its 
contribution to the development of democratic civil society. Nashi’s role supporting the 
regime in contentious politics remains its defining characteristic as long as Russia’s 
democratic deficit persists.
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